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Note
Market Share Liability for DES
(Diethylstilbestrol)' Injury: A New
High Water Mark in Tort Law.
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d
924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 285
(1980).
I. INTRODUCTION
Dynamic changes in products liability have occurred during the
past several decades. 2 The courts, focusing on consumer protec-
tion, have expanded producers' liability by moving away from the
privity doctrine and toward strict liability for manufacturers. 3 A
current effort to protect consumers through products liability law
involved a series of DES cases, in which the plaintiffs proposed
1. Diethylstilbestrol (DES) is a man-made estrogen which was approved by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 1947 for use to prevent miscarriages.
Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM
L. REV. 963, 963 (1978). In 1971 the FDA revoked its approval of DES,
effectively banning its use by pregnant women because of its danger and its
inefffectiveness. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. &
WELFARE, DIETHYLSTILBESTROL CONTRA-INDICATED IN PREGNANCY, in DRUG
BuuL., Nov. 1971, at 1-2. Henderson, Products Liability, 1980 CORP. L. REV.
143, 143. In 1971 DES was linked to the subsequent development of
adenocarcinoma (cancer) of the vagina and uterus in the females born to
women who had used the drug during pregnancy. Herbst, Ulfelder &
Poskanzer, Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina, 284 NEW ENG. J. MED. 878-80
(1971); Note, supra, at 964-65. More recently, the use of DES during
pregnancy has been linked to structural and functional changes in the genital
tracts of males born to such women. These changes may include genital and
lower urinary tract abnormalities, as well as reduced fertility. Gill,
Schumacher & Bibbo, Structural and Functional Abnormalities in the Sex
Organs of Male Offspring of Mothers Treated with Diethylstilbestrol (DES), 16
J. REPROD. MED. 147, 152-53 (1976); N.Y. Times, May 10, 1979, § C, at 7, col. 3.
2. Kroll, Intra-Industry Joint Liability: A New Era in Products Liability, 1979
INs. L.J. 193, 193; Note, Industry-Wide Liability, 13 SUFFOLK L REV. 980, 981
(1979).
3. Note, supra note 2, at 981-82 & nn.7-11.
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"intra-industry joint liability."4 This theory of products liability al-
lows plaintiffs to hold entire industries liable for injuries caused by
defective products of unknown origin.5 The number of plaintiffs
involved in these cases and the likelihood that other plaintiffs will
adapt the theory to different types of cases give the implications of
intra-industry liability a continuing interest.
6
There are four possible bases for intra-industry liability: con-
certed action, alternative liability, industry-wide liability, and mar-
ket share liability.7 Each would allow a plaintiff to collect
substantial damages8 from multiple defendants without proof that
any particular defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries.9 Eliminat-
ing the plaintiff's burden of proving which manufacturer's product
injured the plaintiff virtually guarantees that plaintiffs will prevail
on the causation issue.1 0
In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories," the California Supreme
Court discussed intra-industry liability for adverse effects of drugs
and adopted the market share liability theory for DES injuries.
12
Although the majority purported to shift only the burden of prov-
ing causation from the plaintiff to the defendants, the effect of its
adopting the intra-industry joint liability concept (or, more specifi-
cally, the market share doctrine) is to guarantee that the plaintiff
will prevail on the causation issue.1 3 By departing from traditional
4. Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Sindell v. Abbott
Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 285
(1980); McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1978);
Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1980).
5. Kroll, supra note 2, at 193-94.
6. Note, supra note 2, at 984. For decisions using the intra-industry theory
outside the DES situation, see Wetzel v. Eaton Corp., 62 F.R.D. 22 (D. Minn.
1973); Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972);
Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 868, 148 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1978).
7. Kroll, Intra-Industry Joint Liability: The Era ofAbsolute Products Liability,
1980 INs. L.J. 185, 188.
8. Plaintiffs have recovered damages of up to $800,000 for cancer caused by their
mothers' use of DES during pregnancy. N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1979, at 26, col. 1.
The New York Times reported that $250,000 was awarded to the parents of a
seventeen-year-old girl whose fatal cancer was attributed to DES, and
$500,000 was awarded to a twenty-five-year-old social worker in a similar DES
action. N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1980, at 26, col. 1.
9. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d at 614, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146
(Richardson, J., dissenting).
10. Id.
11. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 285 (1980).
12. 26 Cal. 3d at 613, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
13. Id. at 614, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
Defendants are in no better position to disprove factual causation than plain-
tiffs are to prove it. Note, supra note 1, at 973; Note, supra note 2, at 1000-01.
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tort doctrine14 and effectively eliminating causation as an issue,1 5
"'[m] arket share' liability thus represents a new high water mark
in tort law."'
16
This Note will analyze Sindell and the various approaches
taken to overcome the obstacle of product identification in DES
cases.' 7 In addition, it will examine the legal, social and economic
ramifications of intra-industry joint liability.
H. FACTS
The plaintiff in Sindell brought a class action suit which sought
to hold several major drug companies jointly and severally liable
for injuries she had sustained as a result of her mother's use of
DES as a miscarriage preventative while she was pregnant with
the plaintiff.18 The complaint alleged that DES had caused her to
Shifting the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendants, thus, tips the
scales in favor of the plaintiff on the causation issue.
Market share liability differs from strict tort product liability. In the latter,
the manufacturer generally is assumed to have better access to the informa-
tion necessary to determine the cause of the product-related accident. Mar-
ket share theory, however, assumes that neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant has greater knowledge concerning production of the offending
product. When the market share doctrine is combined with strict tort prod-
uct liability, the possible result is "absolute" liability. Kroll, supra note 7, at
194.
14. Throughout the history of products liability law, courts have viewed the satis-
faction of the identification requirement as a prerequisite for holding a manu-
facturer responsible for damages. Note, supra note 2, at 982. The
manufacturer named in the complaint must have made the product in ques-
tion. This identification requirement is a specific instance of the general legal
requirement that the defendant be the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 103, at 671-76 (4th ed. 1971);
Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 1344 (1973).
15. 26 Cal. 3d at 614, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (Richardson, J., dissent-
ing). See notes 9-10 & accompanying text supra.
16. 26 Cal. 3d at 614, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (Richardson, J., dissent-
ing).
17. Causation is the uniquely difficult aspect of DES cases. However, a DES
plaintiff may encounter other obstacles, including the running of statutes of
limitations, judicial refusals to recognize causes of action for fetal injuries
incurred prior to viability, and the defendants! lack of knowledge of the risks
during the time in question. See generally Comment, supra note 1, at 968-76
nn.22-25.
18. 26 Cal. 3d at 595, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134. Sindell is but one of
many DES suits filed throughout the country. Most are still pending. Those
cases which have already been decided have predominantly favored the drug
company defendants because of the plaintiffs' failure to identify the manufac-
turers of the DES prescribed to their mothers. See Gray v. United States, 445
F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978). The same result was reached in a California
case prior to Sindell. See McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150
Cal. Rptr. 730 (1978). A few courts took the opposite view, adopting novel
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develop precancerous and cancerous tumors and lesions,19 but it
did not identify the specific manufacturer of the DES ingested by
her mother.20 The trial judge sustained the defendants' demurrers
on the ground that the plaintiff failed to identify which defendant
had manufactured the drug responsible for her injuries.21
The California Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's deci-
sion, concluding that the plaintiff had alleged facts sufficient to
state a claim against the defendants.2 2 These included allegations
that the defendant drug companies had collaborated in testing,
marketing, and promoting DES and that they had agreed to a com-
mon formula for the drug in order to permit filling prescriptions
with a brand other than that prescribed.2 3 Pointing to these allega-
tions, the court concluded that the theories of concerted action and
alternative liability were available to the plaintiff.24
III. FOUR THEORIES OF INTRA-TNDUSTRY LIABILITY
The appellate court in Sindell identified two theories which
would support joint and several liability of the defendants. Under
the first theory, concerted action, a person would be liable for harm
resulting from the tortious conduct of others if he assists or en-
courages that conduct, and either has breached a duty owed the
plaintiff or has knowledge that the others' conduct constitutes a
breach of duty.
2 5
theories of joint and several liability in order to enter judgments for the plain-
tiffs. See, e.g., Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1980).
19. 26 Cal. 3d at 594-95, 607 P.2d at 925-26, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133-34. Estimates of the
number of women who took DES to prevent miscarriages between 1947 and
1971 range from one-half million to three milion. Comment, supra note 1, at
963-65, 965 n.6. Because some women took DES during more than one preg-
nancy, as many as four million daughters may have been exposed to cancer
risks. The number of plaintiffs presumably would double if the sons of these
women were proven to have been exposed to cancer risks as well. Hender-
son, supra note 1, at 143 n.1.
20. 26 Cal. 3d at 593-95, 607 P.2d at 925-26, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133-34. Because the
symptoms of DES injury often do not appear in the daughters for twenty
years or more, the plaintiff in a typical DES case is unable to prove which
defendant's drug was involved.
21. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 149 Cal. Rptr. 138 (Ct. App. 1978), vacated, 26 Cal. 3d
588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
22. 149 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
23. Id. at 141-42.
24. Id. at 143.
25. 1 I. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS § 10.1, at 702-04 (1956); RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS § 876 (1939). The minimal requirements for participation in
concerted wrongdoing are as follows:
All those who, in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a
tortious act, actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or
request, or who lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or rat-
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Under the second theory, alternative liability, all negligent de-
fendants would be liable for the plaintiff's injuries if it is possible
to ascertain which defendant actually caused the injuries and if it
is fairly certain that the injuries were caused by one of them. 2 6
The appellate court relied on a well-known California case, Sum-
mers v. Tice,27 in which two negligent hunters were held jointly
and severally liable for the plaintiffs injuries, where it was fairly
certain that the shot came from one of them, but it was impossible
to tell which hunter had fired the particular shot. The burden of
proving causation was shifted to each defendant to exculpate him-
self if possible. The Summers court concluded that it would be un-
fair to leave the plaintiff remediless in the face of the defendants'
concurrent negligence.
2 8
Although not relied upon by the appellate court in Sindell, two
other theories of liability have been proposed as bases for intra-
industry liability: industry-wide 2 9 and market share liability.30
The industry-wide liability theory was suggested first in Hall v. E.I.
ify and adopt his acts done for their benefit, are equally liable with
him.
Express agreement is not necessary, and all that is required is
that there is a tacit understanding.
W. PROSSER, supra note 14, § 46, at 292 (footnotes omitted).
26. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 149 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
27. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
28. Id. at 86, 199 P.2d at 4. The Summers rule has been embodied in the RESTATE-
MENTr (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1965):
[W] here the conduct of two or more actors has been proved to be
negligent or otherwise tortious, and it is also proved that harm to the
plaintiff has been caused by the conduct of only one of them, but
there is uncertainty as to which one .... the burden is upon each
actor to prove that he did not cause the harm .... [T] he reason for
the exception is the injustice of permitting proved wrongdoers, who
among them have inflicted an injury upon the entirely innocent
plaintiff, to escape liability merely because the nature of their con-
duct and the resulting harm has made it difficult or impossible to
prove which one of them has caused the harm.
Id. Comment L
29. This Note will use the term "industry-wide liability." The theory has received
many names: "joint-liability," "synthetic drug industry liability," and "enter-
prise liability." Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 91 Mich. App. 59, 81 n.1, 289 N.W.2d 20,
29 n.1 (1980) (Moore, J., dissenting) (quoting trial court's opinion). "Enter-
prise liability" also has been used to refer to a concept different than that
proposed in Abel. Some courts use the term to describe a basic risk-of-loss
theory premised on the assumption that manufacturers can insure the risk
and pass the cost of insurance on to the consumer. See Klimas v. I.T.&T., 297
F. Supp. 937, 941 nA (D.R.I. 1969). Others use the term to refer to no-fault
products liability systems. See O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault Beyond Auto
Insurance: Some Proposals, 59 VA. L. REV. 749, 773 (1973); Steffen, Enterprise
Liability: Some Exploratory Comments, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 165 passim (1965).
30. 26 Cal. 3d at 598, 611-13, 607 P.2d at 928, 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136, 145.
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Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc. ,31 which involved children who
were injured by the explosion of dynamite blasting caps. The man-
ufacturer of the blasting caps could not be identified because their
markings had been destroyed in the explosion. The plaintiffs sued
six American manufacturers of blasting caps and the industry
trade association, alleging concerted action.3 2 The court decided
that a cause of action existed under the concerted action allegation
because all of the manufacturers had agreed to not place warnings
on the blasting caps although they knew that the caps were dan-
gerous.33 The court also determined that the defendants jointly
controlled the risk because they had delegated some safety func-
tions to a trade association.3 4 The court concluded that imposing
industry-wide liability upon the manufacturers joined in the action
was justified because they were aware of the risk and jointly con-
trolled it.s5 The Hall theory of industry-wide liability grounds each
manufacturer's liability for all injuries caused by its product upon
industry-wide adherence to a specified standard of safety.3 6 The
industry standard itself becomes the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's
injury.3 7 Each industry member contributes to the plaintiff's in-
jury by adhering to the standard, thereby perpetuating the result-
ing manufacture of an unidentifiable injury-producing product.3 8
The market share liability theory is an extension of the Sum-
mers doctrine.3 9 Using an undiluted Summers rationale, it is inap-
propriate to shift the burden of proving causation to the
defendants where there is a possibility that none of them made the
product which injured the plaintiff.40 However, the market share
theory alters this doctrine by shifting the burden of proof to the
defendants if the plaintiff joins the manufacturers of a "substantial
31. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
32. Id. at 359. See note 25 supra.
33. 345 F. Supp. at 373-76.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 386.
36. Those manufacturers who could exonerate themselves by proving that they
did not make the precise unit which caused the injury would not be liable for
the plaintiff's injury. All other manufacturers of the same type of product
would be held jointly and severally liable. Note, supra note 2, at 1000.
37. 26 Cal. 3d at 608, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
38. Id.
39. This extension was suggested in the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 433B (3), Comment h (1964). The Fordham Comment advocated the market
share theory and explained its application to the DES cases. Comment,
supra note 1, at 994-95, 999-1000. The California Supreme Court adopted the
article's proposal and applied it in Sindell. 26 Cal. 3d at 611-13, 607 P.2d at 937,
163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
40. 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45. RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 433B(3), Comment g (1964).
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share" of the type of product which caused the plaintiff's injury.4 1
Under the market share theory, each manufacturer's liability is
equivalent to its percentage of total sales by all manufacturers of
the product.42 Thus, a manufacturer's liability should correspond
to its responsibility for the injuries caused by its own products.
IV. THE DECISION
Although the California Supreme Court rejected the appellate
court's reasoning, it affirmed the outcome of the case on a different
basis: market share liability.43 The supreme court concluded that
the concerted action and alternative liability doctrines, as inter-
preted by the appellate court, could not be applied to hold the
Sindell defendants liable.44 The court reasoned that the defend-
ants' parallel or imitative conduct in relying on each others' testing
and promotion methods described a common practice in the indus-
try, not a concerted action.45 The formula for DES is a scientific
constant which a manufacturer producing the drug must follow by
law.46 For these reasons, and because application of the concerted
action theory to Sindell would expand the doctrine beyond its in-
tended scope, 47 the court found no concert of action among the de-
fendants. 4
8
The supreme court also rejected the alternative liability the-
41. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
42. Each defendant will be liable for the proportion of the judgment represented
by its share of the market, unless the defendant is dismissed from the action
because it could not have made the product which caused the plaintiffs inju-
ries. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. Once the plaintiff
has joined the required defendants, they may cross-complain against the
other manufacturers, alleging that the others might have supplied the injury-
causing product. Id.
43. Id. at 588, 607 P.2d at 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
44. Id. at 603, 606, 607 P.2d at 932, 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139, 141. According to the
supreme court, the defendants did not substantially aid or encourage one an-
other to fail to conduct adequate tests or to give sufficient warnings. The
court concluded that the defendants had no common plan or tacit under-
standing to commit a tortious act against the plaintiff. For examples of situa-
tions in which tacit understandings were found, see Orser v. George, 252 Cal.
App. 2d 660, 60 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1967), and Agovino v. Kunze, 181 Cal. App. 2d
591, 5 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1960).
45. 26 Cal. 3d at 606, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
46. The formula is set forth in the United States Pharmacopoeia; any producer of
the drug must, with exceptions irrelevant here, follow the formula. 21 U.S.C.
§ 351(b) (1976).
47. 26 Cal. 3d at 605, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141. Application of the con-
certed action theory to the Sindell situation would render virtually any man-
ufacturer liable for the defective products of an entire industry, even if it
could be demonstrated that the product which caused the injury was not
made by the defendant. Id.
48. Id. at 606, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
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ory 4 9 While in Summers v. Tice5 0 there was a fifty percent chance
that one of the two defendants was responsible for the plaintiffs
injuries, the court noted in Sindell that any one of two hundred
companies 5 1 which manufactured DES might have made the prod-
uct which injured the plaintiff.52 Therefore, there was no "rational
basis upon which to infer that any defendant in the action caused
plaintiff's injuries, nor even a reasonable possibility that they were
responsible." 53 The court found the chance that any one of the five
defendants 54 supplied the DES to plaintiff's mother was "so re-
mote that it would be unfair to require each defendant to exoner-
ate itself."55 The court, therefore, did not use the alternative
liability doctrine to relieve the plaintiff's burden of proving which
drug manufacturer caused her injuries.
5 6
The supreme court also discussed two other bases of liability:
industry-wide and market share liability.5 7 It declined to apply the
former theory,58 but concluded that adoption of the latter doctrine
49. Id. at 603, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
50. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
51. 26 Cal. 3d at 602-03, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139. Some estimates of the
number of drug companies which manufactured DES for use during preg-
nancy are as high as three hundred. Comment, supra note 1, at 964 n.3.
52. 26 Cal. 3d at 602-03, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
53. Id. According to the Restatement, the burden of proof shifts to the defend-
ants only if the plaintiff demonstrates that all of the defendants acted tor-
tiously and that the harm resulted from the conduct of one of them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 433B(3), Comment g (1964). However,
the rule so far has applied only where all actors involved were joined as de-
fendants and where their conduct was simultaneous, although cases might
arise in which modification of the rule would be necessary because one of the
actors is not or cannot be joined or because of lapse of time or other circum-
stances. Id., Comment h.
54. Abbott Laboratories, Eli Lilly & Co., E.R. Squibb & Sons, the Upjohn Co., and
Rexall Drug Co. were the remaining defendants in Sindell. Either the action
was dismissed or the appeal was abandoned on various grounds as to five
other defendants named in the complaint. 26 Cal. 3d at 596 n.4, 607 P.2d at 927
n.4, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 135 n.4. In similar DES cases, plaintiffs have joined as
many as 94 DES manufacturers as defendants. Comment, supra note 1, at
973.
55. 26 Cal. 3d at 603, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139. Under the alternative
liability theory, a defendant can be dismissed from the action if there is no
possiblity that the defendant could be responsible for the plaintiff's injury.
One defendant in Sindell was dismissed after it demonstrated that it had not
manufactured DES during the period that plaintiff's mother took the drug.
Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. See also Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (1980) (DES case in which the court
adopted the alternative liability theory, but used the market share approach
for the limited purpose of apportioning damages).
56. 26 Cal. 3d at 603, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
57. Id. at 598, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
58. Id. at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
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was warranted.59
The court rejected industry-wide liability because the large
number of producers of DES60 would create practical problems of
management. In addition, it would be unfair to impose liability
upon a manufacturer for injuries resulting from the use of a drug
manufactured within standards suggested or mandated by the gov-
ernment.
6 1
The supreme court did adopt the market share doctrine as the
basis for the defendants' liability.62 Although it perceived that
some discrepancy in the correlation between the market share and
liability is inevitable, 63 the court concluded that policy reasons
59. Id. at 613, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
60. Id. at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143. According to the court in Hall,
to establish industry-wide joint liability, plaintiffs will have to show the de-
fendants' joint awareness of the risks at issue and their joint capacity to re-
duce those risks. In Hall, the plaintiffs demonstrated this by alleging that the
industry had delegated some safety functions to a trade association. Hall v.
El. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. at 372-73. There were no
such allegations in Sindell.
The court in Hall cautioned against applying the theory to industries com-
posed of a large number of producers. "What would be fair and feasible with
regard to an industry of five or ten producers might be manifestly unreasona-
ble if applied to a decentralized industry composed of thousands of small pro-
ducers." Id. at 378.
Even if it is feasible to join many defendants in the complaint, it would be
less than fair to spread DES-related losses among the defendants equally,
because some companies produced and distributed larger amounts of DES
than others. Similarly, proportional distribution seems inequitable, because
many states lack contribution systems flexible enough to adopt such a the-
ory. Thus, losses would fall more heavily on those manufacturers amenable
to suit in states with flexible systems of contribution. In addition, the courts
are not equipped to administer a system of apportionment. Henderson,
supra note 1, at 147. The appellate court in Sindell noted these difficulties,
but concluded that they were not to be resolved at the pleading stage. Sindell
v. Abbott Labs., 149 Cal. Rptr. at 149-50. The California Supreme Court con-
cluded that a proportional distribution system was feasible, and it adopted
the market share liability concept. 26 Cal. 3d at 611-13, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal.
Rptr. at 145.
61. The drug industry is regulated closely by the FDA. Federal regulations spec-
ify the type of tests a manufacturer must perform for certain drugs, 21 C.F.R.
§§ 436.100-.541 (1980), the warnings which appear on labels, 21 C.F.R. § 369.20
(1980), and the manufacturing standards, 21 C.F.R. §§ 211.100-.115 (1980).
FDA approval of a drug is persuasive in a products liability case, unless there
is proof of fraud or nondisclosure by the manufacturer in obtaining the ap-
proval. McDaniel v. McNeil Labs., Inc., 196 Neb. 190, 241 N.W.2d 822 (1976)
(involving the use of Innovar, an anesthetic manufactured and marketed
under FDA approval).
62. 26 Cal. 3d at 613, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
63. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. It is impossible to determine
market share with mathematical exactitude; therefore, a defendant may be
liable for a different percentage of the injuries than its share of the relevant
market would justify. Id. The court concluded that an approximation was as
[Vol. 60:432
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nevertheless warranted application of the market share theory.64
The policy reasons presented by the court were: (1) A change in
the rules of causation and liability is necessary to fashion reme-
dies that meet the changing needs arising from our complex, in-
dustrialized society; (2) between an innocent plaintiff and
negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of injury; (3)
defendants are better able to bear the cost of injuries resulting
from the manufacture of a defective product; and (4) holding drug
manufacturers liable for defects provides an incentive for product
safety.65
The majority did not define what constitutes a "substantial
share" of the DES market,66 but it did reject a suggested require-
ment of seventy-five to eighty percent.67 Therefore, from the ma-
jority's viewpoint, it appears that a "substantial share" is
something less than seventy-five percent.68
V. ANALYSIS
A. Is Market Share Liability an Extension of, or a Break from,
Traditional Tort Law?
According to the Sindell majority, the DES cases are merely a
factual variant upon the theme composed in Summers v. Tice;69
hence, the shift in the burden of proof inherent in market share
liability does not completely lack precedent.7 0
However, according to the dissenting justices, the Summers
justified here as it is in comparative fault or partial indemnity cases. Id. at
613, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
64. 26 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 615, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
67. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. See Comment, supra
note 1, at 996.
68. The court will measure the likelihood that any of the defendants supplied the
product which injured the plaintiff by the percentage obtained by dividing
the amount of DES sold by each defendant manufacturer into the total
amount of the drug sold for the purpose of preventing miscarriages. For ex-
ample, the Sindell plaintiff asserted that the defendants produced 90% of the
DES marketed. If this is established at trial, then there would be a 90% likeli-
hood that this handful of defendants caused the plaintiffs injury, and only a
10% chance that the responsible manufacturer, not named in the action,
would escape liability. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
Difficulties also may arise in attempting to define the terms 'market" and
"substantial share." Kroll, supra note 7, at 193.
69. 26 Cal. 3d at 610-13, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45. See id. at 615, 607
P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J., dissenting); note 28 & accom-
panying text supra.
70. Note, supra note 2, at 1006.
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case differs so fundamentally from the DES cases7 1 that its prece-
dential value is suspect.7 2 In Summers the entire class of responsi-
ble parties was before the court; however, only some of the
potential defendants were joined in Sindell.7 3 "Furthermore, the
negligence of the defendants in Summers caused the plaintiff's in-
ability to identify the tortfeasor."74 Conversely, in Sindell the
plaintiff's inability to satisfy the identification requirement re-
sulted from the passage of time.75 Thus, the dissenters' suspicions
of an unprecedented extension of liabilty seem well-founded.
76
The majority in Sindell argued that the plaintiffs cause of ac-
tion was based on a reason similar to that advanced in Summers:
as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the lat-
ter should (Summers), or are better able to (Sindell), bear the cost
of the injury.77 This "deep pocket" theory of liability, however,
should not play a role in the legal analysis of the case because a
defendant's wealth is an unreliable indicator of fault.7 8 In addition,
"[a] system priding itself on 'equal justice under law' does not
flower when the liability... aspect of a tort action is determined
by a defendant's wealth."
79
B. Policy Considerations
Adoption of the market share doctrine seems unfair if one con-
siders that the theory imposes liability upon manufacturers who
may have had nothing to do with causing the injury.8 0 Such an
inference of fault approaches the imposition of liability on the ba-
sis of injury alone.8 1 Allowing courts to infer fault in this manner
transforms manufacturers into insurers of societal safety.82 Also,
71. 26 Cal. 3d at 615, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J., dissent-
ing).
72. The Sindell determination was a split decision (4-3). The split in the Califor-
nia Supreme Court and the results of DES cases in other jurisdictions cast a
shadow on the strength of the majority view in Sindell. See note 18 supra.
73. Id. at 615, 607"F.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
The market share theory requires only a substantial percentage of the poten-
tially responsible parties to be joined. See notes 50-52, 67-68 & accompanying
text supra.
74. Note, supra note 2, at 1008. See Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1
(1948).
75. See note 20 supra.
76. Kroll, supra note 7, at 193.
77. 26 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
78. Id. at 618, 607 P.2d at 941, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
79. Id. (italics omitted).
80. Id. at 617, 607 P.2d at 940, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
81. Note, supra note 2, at 1014.
82. Schneider v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 401 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1968); Kroll, supra
note 7, at 195-96; Note, supra note 2, at 1011-13. The court in Schneider held
that a manufacturer is not an insurer and cannot be held to a standard of
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such a broad extension of liability may diminish the money avail-
able for recovery.
83
In addition to the problems involved in imposing liability under
the market share theory, allocation of liability is similarly perplex-
ing.84 Assuming that no state other than California will adopt the
market share doctrine because of its radical departure from tradi-
tional tort principles, California courts will allocate liability only to
those manufacturers who are amenable to suit in California.8 5 Ac-
cordingly, as an eventual result of Sindell, California producers of
DES may be held liable for 100 percent of a plaintiff's injuries de-
spite the fact that their aggregate share of the market may be con-
siderably less. 86
Similarly, DES victims would recover unevenly under the mar-
ket share theory.87 California plaintiffs are in a better position
than are out-of-state plaintiffs to recover fully for their injuries be-
cause California plaintiffs can pick and choose their defendants. 88
For example, if the producer which actually caused the injury is
now insolvent, a California plaintiff may recover by joining in the
action other manufacturers of the same product.8 9 Conversely, in
other states which still require identification a plaintiff may have a
judgment which is valid but unenforceable because of insol-
vency.9 0
C. Practical Implications of the Market Share Approach
In view of the legal,9 1 social, and economic consequences of the
duty of guarding against all possible types of accidents and injuries. 401 F.2d
at 557.
83. Note, supra note 2, at 1010-11.
The fear... that liability extended too far will mean recovery at an
unsatisfactory level receives support from two fairly recent develop-
ments in the field of products liability. First, the cost of insurance for
products liability has increased tremendously, to the point at which
some businesses have already been forced to close rather than pay
the premiums. Second, many states have enacted products liability
statutes restricting, rather than broadening, the scope of liability.
Id. at 1011.
84. 26 Cal. 3d at 617, 607 P.2d at 940, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (Richardson, J., dissent-
ing).
85. Id. See note 60 supra.
86. 26 Cal. 3d at 617, 607 P. 2d at 940, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (Richardson, J., dissent-
ing). But see note 42 & accompanying text supra.
87. Cf. Note, supra note 2, at 1009 (by analogy to industry-wide liability).
88. 26 Cal. 3d at 616, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
89. See Note, supra note 2, at 1009-10; Note, Products Liability-Enterprise Lia-
bility-Entire Industry May be Liable if Impossible to Identify Actual Manu-
facturer of Defective Product, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1299, 1307 (1973).
90. Note, supra note 2, at 1010.
91. The DES cases represent only one series of cases in which plaintiffs cannot
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market share theory, it is essential to consider its practical impli-
cations. Market share liability would pervasively affect product
safety and research and development of new products, and it also
could have a detrimental impact on free competition.92
Theoretically, market share liability would promote product
safety because manufacturers of similar products would find it ad-
vantageous to join in establishing higher industry safety stan-
dards. 93 However, it is also possible that the market share doctrine
would decrease product safety because manufacturers would feel
that despite whatever extra precautions are taken during produc-
tion, they still could be held responsible for injuries resulting from
the careless manufacturing practices of others.94 In addition, if
manufacturers are liable regardless of fault,9 5 products liability
judgments may become a mere business expense.9 6 If it is less
costly to pay tort claims than to improve safety, producers may not
bother to correct an injury-causing product.9 7 Market share liabil-
ity, therefore, loses sight of one of the principal goals of the tort
system: to reduce the number of injuries.98
recover under traditional tort doctrines because they cannot satisfy the iden-
tification requirement. Note, supra note 1, at 1007. Other types of suits in
which plaintiffs may seek to employ the market share theory to overcome the
identification obstacle include those involving diseased smokers, chemical
pollution, industrial waste, food additives, and injuries related to drugs other
than DES. See generally Note, supra note 2, at 1002 nn.112-16.
92. Note, supra note 2, at 1003. Many of the effects of market share liability
would seem to be similar to those of industry-wide liability; therefore, the
arguments for or against industry-wide liability, used by authorities cited
herein, apply by analogy to market share liability as well. For a view that the
Sindell doctrine may have no application beyond the context of injuries
caused by unidentifiable, generic-name drugs manufactured according to
government-approved formulas, see Note, Market Share Liability: An An-
swer to the DES Causation Problem, 94 HAZv. L. REv. 668, 678-79 (1981).
93. Note, supra note 2, at 1004-05. Industry organization for the purpose of set-
ting safety standards may, however, violate antitrust laws. Campbell, Enter-
prise Liability-An Adjustment of Priorities, 10 FoRuM 1231, 1236 (1975);
Freedman, No-Fault and Products Liability: An Answer to a Maiden's
Prayer, 1975 INs. L.J. 199, 204; Note, supra note 2, at 1004 n.123. The Sherman
Act proscribes every contract or conspiracy in restraint of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1976).
94. Campbell, supra note 93, at 1235; Note, supra note 2, at 1004.
95. Justice Richardson, dissenting in Sindell, argued that it is wholly speculative
whether any of the defendant drug manufacturers actually was at fault for
the plaintiff's injuries. 26 Cal. 3d at 615, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147
(Richardson, J., dissenting). The majority did not attempt to find which de-
fendant (if any) was responsible for the injuries; rather, liability was as-
signed according to each defendant's market share. 26 Cal. 3d at 613, 607 P.2d
at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
96. Note, supra note 2, at 1004 n.124.
97. Id.
98. Campbell, supra note 93, at 1237.
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Adoption of the market share doctrine may prove to be simi-
larly shortsighted as a matter of social policy concerning the pro-
motion of research and development of new products.99 Although
one commentator maintained that current drug research is dupli-
cative and wasteful, 0 0 public policy favors the research and devel-
opment of new pharmaceuticals.' 0 ' The market share theory could
hamper this research and development because each new discov-
ery would be a potential source of liability.102 If policymakers
want to encourage the development and marketing of new
pharmaceuticals, they must absolve manufacturers of liability aris-
ing from dangers hidden prior to the marketing of the new drug.
0 3
Furthermore, if the drug industry is required to anticipate side ef-
fects or medical complications which might surface a generation
after ingestion, pharmaceutical research laboratories would be
burdened with the duty to predict the future.104
Free competition is one of the most important underpinnings of
the American standard of living. However, it also could suffer from
the Sindell decision.105 The market share theory suggests the so-
cialistic concept of centralized authority for redistributing private
resources.1 0 6 If all producers were held liable for similar products
manufactured by the various members of the industry, the larger
producers would have an incentive to organize the industry and to
attempt to set quality-control standards.107 Dissenting marginal
producers could be driven out of the market, leaving the largest
manufacturers in control.108 If so, the market share liability doc-
99. 26 Cal. 3d at 619-20, 607 P.2d at 941-42, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 149-50. The drug indus-
try may develop a drug critical to the diagnosis, treatment, or cure of adeno-
carcinoma itself; however, the liability created by the market share doctrine
may inhibit the dissemination of the new drug by manufacturers. Id.
100. Note, supra note 1, at 1006 n.250.
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment k (1965).
102. Note, supra note 2, at 1004.
103. Connolly, The Liability of a Manufacturer for Unknowable Hazards Inherent
in His Product, 32 INS. COUNSEL J. 303, 306 (1965).
104. 26 Cal. 3d at 620, 607 P.2d at 942, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 150. DES met every fair test
and medical standard available and applicable at the time of its use. Id.
105. Note, supra note 2, at 1005.
106. Campbell, supra note 93, at 1237.
107. Note, supra note 2, at 1005. See note 93 & accompanying text supra.
108. Marginal producers may dissent because they cannot afford to follow the new
standards. Note, supra note 2, at 1005-06 n.132. Even if the new standards
were affordable by the smaller companies, the consequent industry-wide in-
crease in prices could indicate an antitrust violation. Turner, The Definition
ofAgreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to
Deal, 75 HARv. L. REV. 655 (1962); Note, supra note 2, 1005-06 n.132. Increased
liability resulting from adoption of the market share doctrine would increase
the cost of manufacturers' products liability insurance, with a devastating ef-
fect on small companies. Id. at 1003.
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trine would affect the economic structure of American industry ex-
tensively. 09
VI. A NEW APPROACH TO THE INTRA-INDUSTRY
LIABILITY PROBLEM
The Sindell majority referred to Justice Traynor's opinion in Es-
cola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,11o which recognized the need to
adapt tort principles to changing and complex methods of mass
production and marketing."' One cannot quarrel with the need
for some alteration in the present system of compensating plain-
tiffs injured by defective products."12 The theory of intra-industry
joint liability, which eliminates proof of causation, is an attempt by
the courts to keep pace with society. While market share liability
is a worthy effort at balancing the rights of producers and consum-
ers, the problems inherent in the market share theory"i3 warrant a
search for an alternative solution.
Many commentators have proposed no-fault schemes of prod-
ucts liability to replace our current system."i 4 Others have sug-
gested a limited no-fault version to be administered by an
administrative tribunal."i 5 However, the problems that would
arise from these systems make such changes undesirable.116
There are, undoubtedly, more satisfactory alternatives for appor-
tioning losses from DES injuries than no-fault or market share lia-
bility."i7 Yet, such an apportionment exceeds judicial competence.
It is the province of the legislature, not the judiciary, to weigh the
various economic, social, and political factors involved in such a
complex policy determination."18
Several minor legislative changes might result in better appor-
tionment of DES losses. Partial governmental liability has been
109. Note, supra note 2, at 1005.
110. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
111. 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
112. Campbell, supra note 93, at 1231; Parnon & Pratt, Diagnosis of a Legal Head-
ache: Liability for Unforeseeable Defects in Drugs, 53 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 517,
539 (1979).
113. See notes 80-109 & accompanying text supra.
114. Note, supra note 2, at 1015-19.
115. Id. at 1019-22.
116. A no-fault products liability system may be too socialistic for Americans to
accept. Such a system also would require new insurance coverage methods.
No-fault products liability could diminish the safety level of products. Kroll,
supra note 7, at 196; Note, supra note 2, at 1015-19.
117. Parnon & Pratt, supra note 112, at 536. See notes 125-27 & accompanying text
infra.
118. 26 Cal. 3d at 621, 607 P.2d at 943, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 151 (Richardson, J., dissent-
ing); Parnon & Pratt, supra note 112, at 536-37; Note, supra note 2, at 1022.
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suggested,119 relying upon the belief that government approval of
DES should carry with it some financial responsibility.120 Another
suggestion is to limit the amount of damages a plaintiff could re-
cover; this would decrease a manufacturer's exposure in individual
cases in order to offset its overall expanded liability.121 A legisla-
ture also might boost funding for the agencies responsible for regu-
lating manufacturing. Banning sales of products which violate
statutory quality and safety standards would spur manufacturers
to develop safer products.122 Agency scrutiny, if properly funded,
would deter irresponsibility in the research and development of
new products without substantially inhibiting such undertak-
ings. 2 3
While minor changes in the system will aid plaintiffs today, ma-
jor alterations are needed to cope with the increasing number of
plaintiffs who cannot locate or even identify the manufacturers of
injury-causing products. 24 Perhaps the most satisfactory solution
would be congressional action to establish a framework for uni-
form loss apportionment. This would eliminate the market share
doctrine's problems of uneven distribution of recovery and unfair
allocation of liability.
For example, a scheme similar to the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC) could be instituted, whereby each manu-
facturer deposits into a federal fund a percentage of its gross sales.
Such a plan could be called Manufacturer's Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (MDIC) and would function as follows: Each manufac-
turer of a designated product would pay into the fund a percentage
of its gross income from sales of that product according to a flex-
ible rate assigned to the product. Federal administrators' 25 could
increase the rate for a manufacturer found negligent in its manu-
119. Parnon & Pratt, supra note 112, at 538. New York has approved a $400,000
screening and treatment program for women exposed to DES. N.Y. Times,
July 21, 1978, at 12, col 1.
120. Parnon & Pratt, supra note 112, at 538.
121. Id.
122. Campbell, supra note 93, at 1236-38. Statutory schemes are available for
many products. See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2051-2081 (1976); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301-392 (1976); Federal Hazardous Substances Act of 1960,15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-
1274 (1976). See note 61 supra.
123. Campbell, supra note 93, at 1236-38. Meeting regulatory-body standards will
inhibit research and development of new products. Wall St. J., July 28, 1980,
§ 2, at 13, col 2. However, meeting such standards would not affect research
and development as much as would imposing market share liability upon
manufacturers. See notes 99-104 & accompanying text supra.
124. Note, supra note 2, at 1022.
125. Others also have advocated turning over the products liability field to federal
administrators. E.g., Sandler, Strict Liability and the Needfor Legislation, 53
VA. L REv. 1509, 1518-21 (1967); Note, supra note 2, at 1020.
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facturing practices or could revoke its manufacturing license.
Plaintiffs could collect from the fund for injuries and losses attrib-
utable to defective products without proving that the defect was
foreseeable or that the manufacturers had "joint control of the
risk."'1 26 The only producer identificaton required would be that
the product is American-made.12
7
MDIC would balance the positions of both manufacturers and
consumers. If products became defective, or if unforeseeable flaws
were discovered, the fund could buy back the products, or pay the
resulting injury claims, or both. Hence, a manufacturer would not
face bankruptcy because of an unexpected imperfection in its
product. Research and development of new products would flour-
ish under MDIC because the introduction of a new product would
not be inhibited by the threat of liability. Because contributions to
the fund would be proportional to each producer's gross sales,
marginal producers could still compete with large manufacturers,
and free competition would remain as the mainstay of the Ameri-
can economy. MDIC would allocate liability more equitably than
would the market share doctrine because manufacturers of all
states (rather than just California) would contribute to the pay-
ment of claims. The fund's cost would become a business expense
imposed concurrently with the manufacture of a product; conse-
quently all producers would bear responsibility for injuries caused
by their products, even those occurring after bankruptcy.
MDIC offers advantages to consumers as well as to producers.
Under this plan, recovery for injuries or losses would be allocated
among plaintiffs in all fifty states. In addition, a plaintiff could col-
lect compensation for her injuries regardless of whether the produ-
cer at fault is currently solvent. The absence of a manufacturer
identification requirement128 would allow recovery for plaintiffs
who previously were unjustly denied compensation for their inju-
ries or losses because of their inability to match the injury-causing
product with a producer. Under MDIC, product safety and quality
standards would be policed by federal administrators. Such super-
vision and the threat of lost sales or a rate increase would deter
negligent production practices.
MDIC would include all manufacturers and would not discrimi-
126. "Joint control of the risk" is a requirement which must be met for recovery to
be allowed under the industry-wide liability theory. See notes 33-35 & accom-
panying text supra.
127. Identification of American-made products would allow administrators to im-
pose liability only for those products produced by American manufacturers.
Thus, American producers would not be responsible for losses or injuries as-
sociated with products manufactured outside of the United States.
128. For the foreign-country exception to the elimination of the manufacturer
identification requirement, see note 127 & accompanying text supra.
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nate against certain industries. It would allocate liability fairly
and distribute recovery evenly. The MDIC system for compensa-
tion would not sacrifice deterrence as a control on product safety.
VII. CONCLUSION
The market share doctrine is an attempt to resolve equitably
the question of intra-industry joint liability. Although market
share liability is not the appropriate solution, the California
Supreme Court's decision in Sindell is instructive. Several unset-
tling questions raised by the appellate court in Sindell were an-
swered by the supreme court. First, it reaffirmed the Hall "joint
control of risk" requirement for industry-wide liability. Second, it
held that alternative liability could not be asserted in DES cases.
Some queries, such as the due process ramifications of market
share liability, remain unresolved and may require consideration
by the United States Supreme Court.129
Sindell will affect manufacturers throughout the country. Any
producer dealing in interstate commerce can reasonably expect
that, at some point, its product will reach California.
130 It is diffi-
cult to predict fully the effect on products liability law; however,
Sindell certainly is a landmark in the struggle to solve the produ-
cer identification problem.
Legislatures should aid the courts in adapting traditional tort
doctrines to modern technology. Minor changes in the present sys-
tem will aid plaintiffs and judges today, but major alterations are
imperative for the future. In this regard, MDIC may be a viable
alternative solution to the problem of intra-industry joint liability.
Legislative changes in the future will not assist the courts in mak-
ing today's decisions concerning the producer identification prob-
lem in products liability cases. However, Sindell may encourage
the search for more equitable solutions to the problem of intra-in-
dustry joint liability.
Barbara J. Koperski '81
129. Kroll, supra note 7, at 196-97. The Sindell defendants appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, but certiorari was denied in each case. E.R. Squibb &
Sons, Inc. v. Sindell, 101 S. Ct. 285 (1980); Upjohn Co. v. Sindell, 101 S. Ct. 285
(1980); Rexall Drug Co. v. Sindell, 101 S. Ct. 286 (1980); Abbott Labs. v. Sindell,
101 S. Ct. 286 (1980).
130. Kroll, supra note 7, at 197.

